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ABSTRACT
In human dialogue, listener feedback is a pervasive phenomenon
that serves important functions in the coordination of the conversa-
tion, both in regulating its flow, as well as in creating and ensuring
understanding between interlocutors. This make feedback an in-
teresting mechanism for conversational human–agent interaction.
In this paper we describe computational models for an ‘attentive
speaker’ agent is able to (1) interpret the feedback behaviour of
its human interlocutors by probabilistically attributing listening-
related mental states to them; (2) incrementally adapt its ongoing
language and behaviour generation to their needs; and (3) elicit
feedback from them when needed. We present a semi-autonomous
interaction study, in which we compare such an attentive speaker
agent with agents that either do not adapt their behaviour to their
listeners’ needs, or employ highly explicit ways of ensuring under-
standing. The results show that human interlocutors interacting
with the attentive speaker agent provided significantlymore listener
feedback, felt that the agent was attentive to, and adaptive to their
feedback, attested the agent a desire to be understood, and rated it
more helpful in resolving difficulties in their understanding.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A central concern in conversational interaction is to make one-
self understood and to understand what one’s interlocutor means
with an utterances. This is not simply a task that can be solved
by pure ‘natural language processing’. Understanding goes well
beyond extracting literal meaning from a sentence. It very often re-
quires cooperative interaction between interlocutors, which makes
language use in conversation a ‘collaborative effort’ [17]. When pro-
ducing an utterance, speakers need to design it in a way that makes
Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2018), M. Dastani, G. Sukthankar, E. André, S. Koenig (eds.), July 10–15, 2018,
Stockholm, Sweden. © 2018 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
it likely understandable to the listeners. Conversely, listeners need
to reason about and infer what speakers have likely meant with
their utterance. These processes can be thought of as coordination
tasks and are facilitated by various resources, concrete ones such
as the situation in which a conversation takes place, mental ones
such as the ‘common ground’ [17] between dialogue partners, or
interactional ones such as meta-communication. Giving artificial
conversational agents the ability to use theses types of resources
is a key challenge for enabling them to engage in communicative
interactions that go beyond today’s simple question answering or
information presentation scenarios.
When problems in understanding occur and come to light, in-
teraction partners can try to mitigate, or even solve, them, e.g., by
making a new approach to the utterance that takes the updated in-
formation into account. One prevalent meta-communicative mech-
anism that is used in such situations is ‘listener feedback’ [4], which
serves multiple functions from low-level coordination of the in-
terlocutors’ behaviours (e.g., the amount of information that the
speaker provides), to higher-level coordination of beliefs and atti-
tudes (e.g., what are the beliefs that can be considered shared, i.e.,
in the common ground) [26].
The present work deals with such feedback-based coordination
between (embodied) artificial conversational agents and their hu-
man interaction partners. In previous work we presented compu-
tational models for an artificial conversational agent— described
elsewhere [12, 14–16]—which has the capability to interpret the
conversational feedback of its human interaction partners and to
adapt its language production processes according to the attributed
needs (e.g, there seems to be an understanding problem, so let’s try
again, this time providing some more information). In this paper,
we describe an interaction study to investigate (1) whether human
interlocutors are actually willing to provide natural communicative
listener feedback to artificial conversational agents, and (2) whether
human interlocutors notice that they are interacting with an (at-
tentive speaker) agent that invests a certain collaborative effort in
the joint project of making itself understood.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides some back-
ground on communicative listener feedback and describes related
work on feedback in human–agent interaction. Section 3 briefly de-
scribes the computational models underlying the attentive speaker
agent, followed, in section 4, by a description of the study on interac-
tions between the attentive speaker agent and human interlocutors.
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2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Listener Feedback
Communicative feedback is an inconspicuous phenomenon that
does not take centre-stage but is secluded in the background. Feed-
back takes place in the ‘back channel’ [47, p. 568], on ‘track 2’ [17,
p. 241]. One of its defining features is that it does not adhere to—
nor interferes with— the systematics of turn-taking. It does not
occupy a turn, but may be placed with relatively few restrictions
in parallel to an ongoing turn. To be unobtrusive, feedback signals
are generally (i) short (i.e., they consist of minimal verbal/vocal
expressions), (ii) locally adapted to their prosodic context (i.e., the
speaker’s utterance) by being more similar in pitch to their im-
mediate surrounding than regular utterances [23], or (iii) taking
place in the visual modality, for example as head gestures or facial
expressions [2, 3].
Despite being such an inconspicuous phenomenon, communic-
ative feedback is very expressive. Short communicative feedback
expressions, such as yeah, okay, hm, can be recombined and re-
duplicated in many ways [1, 44], as well as changed continuously
through prosodic modification [e.g., 21, 43]. In this way, feedback
spans a large space of forms that map on an equally rich meaning
space. In addition to this, non-verbal feedback signals are, depend-
ing on the modality, specialised to express their own meaning
spaces (e.g., facial expressions are well suited to express attitudinal
feedback).
From a cognitive point of view, communicative feedback has
been framed as a mechanism to express (with different levels of
awareness) the listening-related mental states (being in contact,
willingness and ability to perceive, understand, accept, and agree)
that an interlocutor experiences when listening to the dialogue
partner that currently holds the speaking role [4, 27].
2.2 Feedback in human–agent interaction
There is an ongoing research effort to model feedback computa-
tionally for artificial conversational agents. Considerable effort has
been spent on the question when it would be appropriate for an
agent to produce feedback signals. This has been approached from
multiple perspectives, by identifying prosodic cues in speakers’
speech [45], by identifying multimodal cues of speakers [32], or
triggered through problems when processing speakers’ utterances
[27]. Research has also tackled the question which specific feedback
signal should be generated, e.g., based on the listener agent’s mental
and emotional state [7, 27], or justified by the reaction that specific
feedback signals will likely evoke in the speaker [35].
Less work has approached the problem of modelling the pro-
cesses within an artificial conversational agent in the role of the
speaker. In an early, but already quite comprehensive, approach,
Dohsaka and Shimazu [20] describe a dialogue model for incre-
mental response generation to user utterances, including feedback,
which, however, was only evaluated in simulation. Nakano and col-
leagues [34] present a model, informed by an analysis of a human–
human interaction study, for estimating groundedness and choosing
subsequent acts in a direction giving scenario based on multimodal
user feedback. In a preliminary evaluation study some non-verbal
but no verbal feedback was provided by users. Reidsma and col-
leagues [36] describe various efforts towards a conversational agent
that is ‘attentively speaking’: it can perceive and classify feedback
produced by the listener, elicit feedback from the listener, and flex-
ibly adapt behaviours in response to feedback. Skantze and col-
leagues [39] focus on interpreting multimodal signals such as gaze,
verbal expressions, but also timing and what these says about the
listener’s uncertainty, completion of the current activity, etc. Misu
and colleagues [31] focusses on feedback elicitation cue genera-
tion and whether this evokes feedback responses from the agent’s
human interlocutors.
In previous work [13] we defined ‘attentive speaker agents’ to
be conversational agents that should be able to
(1) interpret communicative listener feedback from their human
interlocutors, taking the dialogue context into account, and
(2) adapt their ongoing and/or subsequent natural language
utterances, paying heed to their interlocutors’ needs— as
inferred in (1).
The underlying property that makes such agents ‘attentive’, is that
they need to be ‘willing’ to work towards being understood and
to make extra efforts — if necessary — to achieve this. This desire
plays a role in (1) and (2), and additionally requires attentive speaker
agents to
(3) invite feedback from their interlocutors by providing oppor-
tunities or producing feedback elicitation cues when needed.
These three properties follow directly from psycholinguistic
research on speaker-listener interaction in dialogue: (1) Communic-
ative feedback serves as ‘evidence of understanding’ [17, 19] and
information on further basic communicative functions [4, 27], see
below. (2) Speakers monitor their interlocutors and immediately ad-
apt to their feedback [5, 18, 28]. (3) speakers actively seek feedback
from their interlocutors [6, 9]. All this shows that feedback provided
by attentive listeners and responded to by attentive speakers goes
well beyond simple backchannelling, which dominates research on
feedback in artificial conversational agents.
3 MODELLING THE ATTENTIVE SPEAKER
The three properties of attentive speaking require dedicated com-
putational models and an integration in an attentive speaker agent.
Each of these models has been presented individually in previous
work [12, 14–16]. Here, we briefly summarise them before turning
to the study evaluation them in human–agent interaction.
3.1 Feedback interpretation as mental state
attribution
The first requirement for attentive speaker agents is that they are
able to interpret the feedback that their human interaction part-
ners provide to them. In our model, we adopt Allwood, Kopp and
colleagues’ [4, 27] cognitive perspective on feedback, namely that
feedback is an expression of the listener’s listening-related mental
state. Feedback can thus be framed as evidence of the listeners will-
ingness and ability to understand (perceive, accept, and so forth; see
section 2.1). Because of this, we model feedback interpretation as a
mental state attribution process. The model assumes that a listener
L whose current level of understanding is ‘high’ (for example), has
a mental state that represents this phenomenal state in terms of a
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belief, say BL (U = high)1. The mental state attribution process of
the attentive speaker thus needs to be able to infer this belief of
the listener and represent it as a belief itself, which is known as
mentalising or theorising about the mind of the other [22]. As the
mapping from mental state to feedback is not conventionalised, this
attribution process involves uncertainty on the side of the attentive
speaker. Hence the belief of a speaker S that the listener L believes
that her level of understanding is high, becomes a matter of degree,
which can be represented in terms of subjective probability (the
confidence that the speaker has in this belief being true):
bS (BL (U = hiдh)) = PrBL (U ) (high)
Where PrBL (U ) is a probability distribution over the individual
states that U may be in (in our model we use a ternary grading,
namely low, medium, and high). It is important to note that this
model of the listener’s mental state implies that her belief to be in
a specific level of understanding is certain and crisp. Uncertainty
about the listener’s belief is only modelled on the side of the speaker.
This allows for a representation of a single attributed mental
state as a random variable (e.g., U ). The full model for interpreting
the listener’s feedback thus needs to represent one random vari-
able for each of the speaker’s beliefs about the listener’s various
listening-related mental states (contact, perception, understanding,
acceptance, and agreement). This belief state, the ‘attributed listener
state’ (ALS) can be represented as a joint probability distribution
PrALS (C , P ,U ,AC ,AG ), but also can be represented, assuming con-
ditional independence between some of these variables, in a more
compact way using the representational and computational form-
alism of Bayesian networks [25]. This approach also allows us to
model the hierarchical relationships between listening-related men-
tal states that are described in the literature on the semantics and
pragmatics of feedback [4, 10] and build on the general principle of
‘upward completion’ in language use [17, p. 147].
As listening-related mental states evolve over time and in parallel
to the dialogue, the attribution process also needs to take temporal
dynamics into account. We model this by using dynamic Bayesian
networks [25, sec. 6.2.2]. Each time slice of the network corresponds
to the specific increment inwhich the attentive speaker agentmoves
forward in the dialogue (in our case these are dialogue segments
roughly the size of intonation units, which are produced by the
incremental and adaptive natural language generation component
of the speaker agent, see section 3.2).
Figure 1 shows how the attributed listener state model unrolls
over three steps in time. At each time step t , properties of the
human interlocutor’s feedback signals as well as information about
the immediate dialogue context (e.g., how difficult is the utterance
that the speaker produces) are provided as evidence to the dynamic
Bayesian network, which is then used to infer the current belief
state of the attentive speaker agent regarding the interlocutor’s
listening-related mental states.
3.2 Adaptive behaviour generation
Our second requirement for attentive speaker agents is that they can
adapt their behaviour, especially their language production, in such
a way that they take the listener’s needs into account. The model for
1B is the belief operator and BL (x ) means L beliefs x
ALSti ALSti+1ALSti−1
Feedback Context
Cti−1
Pti−1
Uti−1
ACti−1
AGti−1
GRti−1
Feedback Context
Cti
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Uti
ACti
AGti
GRti
Cti+1
Pti+1
Uti+1
ACti+1
AGti+1
GRti+1
Feedback Context
Figure 1: Illustration of a dynamic ALS two time-slice
Bayesian network model unrolling over three steps in time,
each corresponding to one dialogue segment. Dashed arrows
are disregarded during inference in subsequent time-slices,
i.e., variables from time slice BNALSt−1 and evidence vari-
ables in time slice BNALSt have no influence on variables in
time slice BNALSt+1 . The posterior distributions of attributed
listener state variables (C, P, U, AC, AG) as well as the groun-
dedness variable GR in time slice BNALSt are taken as prior
distributions at time ti+1.
feedback interpretation described in the previous section infers and
represents an up-to-date mental state of the listener at any point in
the dialogue. Our model for adaptive behaviour generation makes
use of this information for incrementally adapting the speaker
agent’s language generation and dialogue management decisions.
The natural language generation component we use is an incre-
mental and adaptive variant of the SPUD microplanner [40, 41].
How it generates natural language incrementally is described in
[12], here it suffices to say that we use it to incrementally pro-
duce descriptions of calendar operations (announcement of new
appointment, changes to existing appointments due to conflicts,
etc.) and that the generation mechanisms takes the most recent
attributed listener state into account each time it generates an in-
crement of a description. This allows for adaptation to take place
while utterances are ongoing. If, for example, a degradation of the
listener’s understanding is indicated through feedback, the natural
language generation component can take this information from the
attributed listener state into account in its next increment, e.g, by
inserting additional or redundant information, or by repeating the
increment that may have led to the problem in understanding. The
information in the attributed listener state is used to parametrise
the central decision-making function in the generation component
as in [29].
On the level of dialogue management, adaptation also happens
in the decision mechanism, e.g., after the presentation of an in-
formation presentation unit such as a calender item, the attributed
listener state is evaluated whether the listener’s understanding is
sufficient for current purposes or whether actions are necessary to
increase the listener’s level of understanding (e.g., by repeating the
complete information presentation unit).
3.3 Elicitation cue generation
The final requirement for attentive speaker agents is that the agent
should actively seek feedback from listeners if they do not provide
feedback pro-actively. This is modelled via an assessment of the
information needs of the agent and realised with a simple threshold
model that evaluates the attributed listener state (e.g., has themental
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state of understanding currently attributed to the listener been static
for a specific amount of time and is the listener’s understanding
not as high as it should ideally be?). If such an information need is
observed, the agent produces multimodal feedback elicitation cues
by inserting pauses, gazing at the listener, and may even provide a
verbal elicitation cue such as okay?. These cues are generated and
realised incrementally as well and can, in principle, be inserted at
each boundary of the increments generated by the the adaptive
incremental natural language generation component.
3.4 Integration in an attentive speaker agent
The three models described above have been integrated in an at-
tentive embodied speaker agent that can present appointments and
calendar operations to its human interlocutors (see [11, chp. 8]
for details). The agent is currently operated in a semi-autonomous
manner: signal properties of the interlocutor’s feedback behaviour
(function, polarity, modality, gaze) are entered into the system in
real-time by a human Wizard-of-Oz that observes the system’s
human interlocutor.
This information is then used by the three computational models
to autonomously interpret the listener’s feedback given the dia-
logue context, adapt its incrementally generated ongoing verbal
and nonverbal behaviour, and generate feedback elicitation cues if
needed. All information in the system is processed incrementally,
based on the principles of the incremental unit framework [38].
4 INTERACTINGWITH THE ATTENTIVE
SPEAKER
The artificial attentive speaker agent described above was used to
investigate the research questions we pursue here: (1) are human
interlocutors willing to provide natural communicative listener
feedback to artificial conversational agents, and (2) do human inter-
locutors notice that they are interacting with an agent that makes a
collaborative effort in the joint project of making itself understood?
We carried out an interaction study inwhich the attentive speaker
agent described calender-related information to its human inter-
locutors. Participants had the task to understand this information
as well as possible so that they would be able to recall it afterwards.
Experimental conditions. In order to be able to compare the effects
of the attentive speaker agent, the interaction study consisted of
three experimental conditions. The target condition
AS In the ‘attentive speaking’ condition participants interac-
ted with the attentive speaker agent, which perceived parti-
cipants’ feedback (via the wizard, see section 3.4), probabilist-
ically attributed listening-related mental states based on this
information, adapted its speech production on the levels of
natural language generation and dialogue management, and
elicited feedback using verbal and nonverbal cues— if it had
information needs. The dialogue strategy used in condition
AS is illustrated in fig. 2 (left): immediately after a complete
information presentation unit is incrementally generated
and realised (U), the attributed listener state is evaluated (E).
Based on this evaluation, the agent decided to either continue
with the next utterance (if a participant’s understanding is
estimated to be sufficiently high; C), repeat the current ut-
terance (if a participant’s understanding is estimated to be
insufficient; R), or, if the evaluation result did not allow for
a clear decision, ask the participant whether it should either
continue or repeat (A). Participants then had to answer this
question for the interaction to proceed.
was compared with two control conditions that served as baselines:
EA In baseline condition ‘explicit asking’ participants interacted
with a speaker agent that did not process or consider any
feedback signals, but followed a fixed dialogue strategy ac-
cording to which the agent explicitly asked, after the realisa-
tion of each complete information presentation unit, whether
it should either continue with the next one, or repeat the cur-
rent one (see fig. 2, centre). Participants then had to answer
this question for the interaction to proceed.
NA In baseline condition ‘no-adaptation’ participants interacted
with a speaker agent that did not process or consider any
feedback signals and followed a fixed dialogue strategy ac-
cording to which the agent immediately continued with the
next information presentation unit after the current utter-
ance was realised (see fig. 2, right).
Conditions EA and NA were created to test agents with different
levels of adaptivity to the interlocutor. Furthermore they served as
upper- and lower-bound baselines on participants’ understanding of
the information that the agents presented and on standard dialogue
evaluation measures (such as PARADISE; [42]). As participants in
condition EAwere always asked by the agent how to continue, they
could freely choose to have items repeated as often as they like. We
expected dialogues with these agents to be long, but information
transfer to be effective. Participants in condition NA on the other
hand, were never asked whether they would like to hear a repetition
of a unit. We expected dialogues with these agents to be short,
but information transfer to be ineffective. The target condition AS
should lie right in the middle of these two conditions, as the agent
only repeated information if it inferred this to be necessary, or if
it was uncertain and the participant wanted to hear a repetition.
Interaction with the target agent should be shorter in duration than
with the agent in condition EA, but more effective than with the
agent in conditionNA. We do not consider measures of effectiveness
and costs in the context of this paper, though.
The study followed a between-subject design. Each participant
interacted with one of the embodied conversational agents in an
information presentation task in a calender assistant domain. The
agent talked about calendar items and changes to the calendar
(e.g., ‘‘The events are: on Tuesday from 13 to 14 o’clock Lunch
and directly afterwards from 14 to 16 o’clock Math 101.”), which
participants had to understand well enough to be able to recall
afterwards. Importantly, participants across all conditions were
told that they cannot speak freely with the agent (for technical
reasons; the agent did not respond to such utterances), but may
provide multimodal listener feedback, which the agent might take
into account in its own behaviour. Information was presented in
six dialogue phases (each consisting of two to three information
presentation units), which were followed by a recall phase in which
calender items needed to be written down in a paper calendar
template.
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Figure 2: Dialogue phases in the study consisted of two
to three information presentation units, the structure of
which differed depending on the experimental condition
(AS/EA/NA). Nodes represent the following actions: U –
present information in an incremental utterance; E – evalu-
ate current attributed listener state, decide what to do next,
and describe this to the participant; C – continue with next
unit; R – repeat this unit; A – ask interlocutor whether to
repeat or continue.
Participants. Thirty-six participants, twelve per experimental
condition, were recruited from Bielefeld’s student population and
compensated with 5 euro. Participants were between 18 and 40
years old (M = 24.2, SD = 4.4); 25 reported to be female, 11 to be
male; 33 reported to be native speakers of German (the others re-
ported a mean of 13.8 years of experience speaking German); 18 of
the participants reported prior experience interacting with virtual
agents or humanoid robots; four participants reported non-normal
and non-corrected vision; one participant reported non-normal and
non-corrected hearing. Participants were blindly assigned to exper-
imental conditions. An analysis of the distribution of participant
features across conditions yielded that an influence of gender and
vision on the outcome of our study could not be ruled out com-
pletely.2
Supplementary Material. Research data and (statistical) analyses
in Python/R are archived and available as a citable data publication
at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.6171260.
4.1 Participants’ feedback behaviour
The first question we addressed is whether participants actually
provided feedback to the conversational agents that they interac-
ted with. We annotated participants’ feedback behaviour based on
the webcam-videos, which gave annotators the same information
that the wizard had. Using the audio-tracks only, participants’ ut-
terances were segmented and those with feedback-characteristics
that were not produced in response to questions of the agent were
classified as verbal/vocal feedback and transcribed, using Praat [8],
based on the conventions used in the ALICO-corpus [30]. Similarly,
using the video-tracks only, participants’ head gesture feedback
was segmented and labelled using ELAN [46], head gestures pro-
duced while responding to questions of the agent were filtered out
2In both cases contingency table Bayes factor tests (with prior concentration set to
a = 1) only find ‘anecdotal’ evidence in favour of the null-hypothesis of independence
of participant feature from experimental condition (bf01 = 2.557 for gender; bf01 =
2.661 for vision). ¶ The interpretation of the strength of evidence for a hypothesisA in
comparison to a hypothesis B (the Bayes factor bfAB) follows Jeffreys [24, p. 432] and
is stated in single quotes throughout this paper. ¶ All Bayesian statistics was computed
using the ‘BayesFactor’ R package [33].
afterwards. Head gesture unit labels were limited to the head move-
ment types nod, shake, jerk, tilt, turn, protrusion, and retraction
[30]. Thirty-three interactions (of 36; audio-visual data was miss-
ing for three interactions) were segmented, transcribed, annotated,
and analysed. Transcriptions and annotations were checked and
corrected through systematic listening.
In total, 734 feedback signals were encountered. 127 (17.3%) of
these were unimodal verbal signals, 296 (40.3%) were unimodal
head gestures, and 311 (42.4%) were bimodal signals, in which a
verbal/vocal feedback expression and a head gesture unit were pro-
duced in overlap. This showed that participants of the interaction
study produced feedback signals in response to the communicative
actions of the artificial conversational agents, a result that was
found previously (e.g, in [36], see section 2.2).
Next, we looked at these feedback signals in a slightly more
detailed way— looking at classes of feedback form and their dis-
tribution— and investigated whether the feedback behaviour of
participants was similar to the feedback behaviour that humans
produce in natural human–human dialogue.
Of the 436 verbal/vocal feedback signals produced, the most
frequently used feedback expression was okay (41.5%), followed
by mhm (18.3%), ja (14.2%), m (6%), nein (3.2%), hm (1.8%), ja
okay (1.6%), and nee (1.4%). These were followed by a ‘long tail’ of
expressions (each < 1%). This distribution resembles the one we
found in human–human conversations in the ALICO-corpus [30,
tbl. 7], where the four most frequent feedback expressions are ja,m,
mhm, and okay, too. Of the 598 head gestures produced as feedback,
81.6% were labelled nod, 8.9% tilt, 6.4% shake, and 3.2% jerk. The
distribution of head gesture types is also similar to human–human
conversation [30, tbl. 4]. Both distributions are ‘nod-heavy’ and
in both cases the four most frequent units are nod, jerk, tilt, and
shake. The 311 bimodal feedback signals participants produced
were coherent across modalities. Almost all head gestures of the
category nod occurred together with verbal feedback expressions
of positive polarity (okay, mhm, ja and m). Head gestures of the
type shake occurred together with verbal feedback expression of
negative polarity (nein and variants such as hm nein). Head gesture
types tilt and jerk rarely occurred in overlap with verbal/vocal
feedback. We conclude that feedback is comparable in form and
distribution to the feedback that humans use in human–human
dialogue.
Participant across all three conditions were told in the instruc-
tions that they can provide multimodal communicative listener
feedback, only in the target condition AS, however, did the agent
attend to the feedback, adapt its own behaviour, and elicited feed-
back from its interlocutors. Because of this, we hypothesised that
participants’ feedback behaviour differed between experimental
conditions, more specifically, we expected that participants provide
more feedback in the target condition AS than in the two control
condition EA and NA.
To test this hypothesis, we analysed participants’ feedback fre-
quency, which, in contrast to the absolute number of feedback sig-
nals, is a measure that is comparable across conditions. We defined
feedback rate to be the number of feedback signals per presentation
(which varies with the number of repetitions).
Across all conditions, participants produced between 0 and 2.4
feedback signals per presentation unit, with a mean feedback rate
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Figure 3: Distribution of participants’ feedback rate (num-
ber of feedback signals per presentation; see text) by exper-
imental condition. Data points are y-jittered in translucent
light grey; black dots are medians, black lines are whiskers,
mid gaps are quartiles.
of M = 1.1 (SD = 0.8). Analysing participants’ feedback beha-
viour by experimental condition we found differences in feedback
rate. Participants in condition AS had a mean feedback rate of
M = 1.97 (Mdn = 1.93, SD = 0.22,min = 1.65,max = 2.4). Par-
ticipants in condition NA followed with a mean feedback rate of
M = 0.65 (Mdn = 0.56, SD = 0.6, min = 0.06,max = 1.94). Parti-
cipants in condition EA only had a mean feedback rate ofM = 0.1
(Mdn = 0.41, SD = 0.31,min = 0,max = 0.92). Figure 3 shows the
distribution of feedback rate by condition.
To confirm our hypothesis that participants provided more feed-
back in the target condition AS, we analysed feedback rates in a
Bayesian framework3. A Bayesian ANOVA yielded the Bayes factor
bf10 = 1.042e7, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence for the
alternative hypothesis that feedback frequencies differ between
experimental conditions against the null hypothesis that only con-
tains the intercept. We further analysed this omnibus result with
post-hoc tests. Firstly, we analysed our hypothesis that participants
in target condition AS produced more feedback per presentation
than participants in condition EA, i.e, AS > EA. We did this using
a BayesFactor two sample t-test4. For the one-sided alternative
hypothesis of a positive effect, i.e., that participants in target con-
dition AS produced more feedback signals per presentation than
participants in control condition EA, this yielded the Bayes factor
bf>0 = 3.934e8, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence against the
null hypothesis that there were no differences. The complement-
ary alternative hypothesis of a negative effect yielded the Bayes
factor bf<0 = 0.004, which is considered ‘decisive’ evidence in fa-
vour of the null hypothesis. Directly comparing the two alternative
hypotheses yielded the Bayes factor bf>< = 8.868e10, which is
‘decisive’ evidence in favour of our hypothesis that participants
in condition AS produced more feedback per presentation than
participants in condition EA. Secondly, we analysed the hypothesis
that participants in the target condition AS produced more feed-
back per presentation than participants in control condition NA, i.e,
AS > NA, using the same approach. The results parallel the ones
above, the details are shown in table 1. Finally, we analysed the
experimental condition EA against condition NA. Here our hypo-
thesis was that there should be no difference in feedback rate since
3 Carrying out the analysis using classic null-hypothesis significant testing yielded
similar results.
4Using the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r =
√
2/2), for each one-sided
alternative hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the null hypothesis (no effect),
and then against each other.
Table 1: Bayes factor analyses of feedback rate (feedback sig-
nals per presentation). Bayes factor t-tests of conditionsAS :
EA and AS : NA analyse both alternative hypotheses against
the null hypothesis, and against each other. The test EA :NA
is two-sided and two sample.
Comparison Bayes factor t-tests
bf>0 bf0< bf><
AS : EA 3.934e8 225.395 8.868e10
AS : NA 5.148e4 100 5.016e6
EA : NA bf01 = 1.467
the agents in both conditions ignored the participants’ feedback
signals. The analysis yielded the Bayes factor bf01 = 1.467, which
can be considered ‘anecdotal’ evidence for the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in feedback rate. Such weak evidence, how-
ever, suggests that we do not have enough data to make a definite
statement.
Both analyses show that participants who interacted with the
attentive speaker agent (in the target condition AS) clearly pro-
duced more feedback signals per presentation than participants
that interacted with the agents that were ignorant of participants’
feedback (in the control conditions EA and NA). No difference in
feedback rate between these latter two conditions were found. We
can conclude from this that the attentive speaker agent’s capabilit-
ies and behaviour had a decisive effect on the rate of communicative
listener feedback being provided.
Analysing participants’ feedback, we further found that their
feedback rates did not vary much over time. In condition AS, the
standard deviation of the mean feedback rate across dialogue phases
and participants was SD = 0.23 and it was even smaller in condi-
tions EA (SD = 0.08) and NA (SD = 0.11). That is, participants in the
control conditions stopped providing feedback early on, probably
because they felt that providing feedback does not have an effect.
An alternative explanation for this might simply be that the attent-
ive speaker agent actively elicited feedback from its interlocutors,
which the agents in the control conditions did not.
To investigate this issue, we analysed how ‘effective’ (being re-
sponded to by participant feedback within a 4 seconds interval)
the feedback elicitation cues of the attentive speaker agent were.
Across interactions in condition AS the attentive speaker agent had
a mean elicitation cue rate (defined analogously to feedback rate)
ofM = 1.8 (Mdn = 1.86, SD = 0.26), that is, on average 1.8 feedback
elicitation cues were produced for each presentation. On average,
61% of the cues were effective. Overall, however, only 54% of par-
ticipants’ feedback signals were preceded by an elicitation cue of
the agent, which, in turn, means that 46% of participants’ feedback
signals were produced ‘pro-actively’. Participants in condition AS
pro-actively produced 0.91 feedback signals per presentation, which
is 9.1, respectively 1.4, times as high as the mean feedback rates
in conditions EA and NA. The difference in feedback rate between
condition AS and the control conditions thus cannot simply be due
to the feedback elicitation cues that the attentive speaker agent
produced.
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In conclusion we can say that (i) in conversation with attentive
speaker agents, human interaction partners provided communic-
ative listener feedback that is similar in surface form to feedback
that occurs in human–human interaction; (ii) the behaviour of the
agent was decisive for its human interaction partner’s feedback
behaviour; (iii) participants interacting with agents that did not
respond to communicative listener feedback seemed to become,
on some level, aware that providing feedback has no effect – and
stopped doing it; and (iv) feedback elicitation cues were effective,
but the rate of pro-actively produced feedback still exceeded the
feedback rate in both control conditions. This suggests that parti-
cipants who interacted with the attentive speaker agent noticed
that their feedback behaviour had an effect on the agent and the
interaction.
4.2 Subjective perception of the agents
We now turn to subjective factors that reflect the participants’
perception of the agent. We measured these factors with a question-
naire that immediately followed the interaction study and asked
participants to report their subjective experience of the interaction.
In total, twenty items were presented in random order and had to
be rated on seven-point Likert scales5. We looked at participants’
responses to a selection of six of the twenty items that were of
particular interest, namely those that focussed on the agents’ per-
ceived feedback processing capabilities, whether the agents were
perceived to be attentive and adaptive to participants’ feedback and
needs, and whether the agents were perceived to be ‘helpful’ [37,
p. 58] in resolving difficulties in understanding.
In contrast to usual analyses of questionnaires of Likert scale
items, we compared ratings of items individually, i.e., not grouped
into higher level factors, since the questionnaire was not developed
with the intent of items to be grouped. This made it difficult to
do an inferential analysis because type I errors due to multiple
testing became very likely. We therefore carried out a descriptive
analysis in which, for each item, we compared the median rating
of the experimental conditions. We substantiated our arguments
by making estimations of how likely, given the data, the observed
ordering of a rating of an item is in relation to its alternatives.
We did this— similar to the the Bayesian analysis in the previous
section— by first computing the Bayes factor t-test6 for each one-
sided alternative hypothesis (positive/negative effect) against the
null hypothesis (no effect), and then against each other. The relevant
Bayes factor values, where evidence is at least ‘substantial’, are
shown in fig. 4.
In general we expected that participants in the target condition
AS would provide higher ratings than participants in both control
conditions EA and NA. We also expected that participants who
interacted with the agent that explicitly asked whether it should
repeat or continue (EA) would be rated higher than the agent that
did not adapt at all (NA) — at least for some of the questionnaire
items.
5Labels for the response anchors were: 1—strongly disagree, 2—disagree, 3—some-
what disagree, 4—neither agree nor disagree, 5—somewhat agree, 6—agree, and 7—
strongly agree.
6We used the default, ‘medium’-scaled prior distribution (r =
√
2/2). ¶ We merely
used the tests as a tool for weighing the evidence for specific orderings of experimental
conditions.
Q4— The agent gave me signals when he wanted to have feedback
1 74
BF><= 8.006
BF><= 12.145
Q5— The agent wanted me to understand him
1 74
BF><= 3.355
BF><= 95966
BF><= 1067.6
Q8— The agent is able to tell whether or not I have understood what he has said
1 74
BF><= 11.959
BF><= 56.119
Q9— The agent perceived my attitude towards calendar items
1 74
BF><= 11.691
BF><= 3.226
Q10— The agent was attentive to me and adapted to my needs
1 74
BF><= 19.712
BF><= 33.180
Q11— The agent helped me resolve difficulties in understanding
1 74
BF><= 457.68
BF><= 4751.5
BF><= 4.403
Figure 4: Median ratings and Bayes factor-based compar-
ison of selected questionnaire items across experimental
conditions ( AS; EA; NA). Brackets over two median
dots show the Bayes factor t-test value comparing both
one-sided alternative hypotheses (positive/negative effect)
against each other. Colour-coded angle brackets indicate or-
dering of conditions (given, e.g., bf><, a value > 0 is evid-
ence in favour of the ordering AS > EA, a value < 0 would
be evidence in favour of the inverse ordering AS < EA). In-
tensity encodes strength of evidence as follows: ‘substan-
tial’ — ‘strong’— ‘very strong’— ‘decisive’. Brackets for evid-
ence considered merely ‘anecdotal’ are omitted.
We started by looking at the item The agent gave me signals when
he wanted to have feedback (Q4). The analysis found ‘substantial’,
respectively ‘strong’, evidence that participants in condition AS and
EA were more convinced that the agent provided signals in order
to elicit feedback than participants in condition NA, who where
rather uncertain about this. The fact that target condition AS and
control condition EA were rated similarly (there was not enough
evidence to draw conclusions from the slight difference in median
ratings) suggests that participants not only took the AS-agent’s
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elicitation cues as requests for feedback, but also interpreted the
EA-agent’s explicit request (whether to continue or repeat) after
the presentation of each unit as a feedback request.
Interestingly, this similarity between conditions AS and EA dis-
appeared in the item The agent wanted me to understand him (Q5).
Although the analysis still yielded ‘decisive’ evidence that parti-
cipants in both conditions AS and EA attributed to the agent a desire
to be understood that is higher than in condition NA, there was
‘substantial’ evidence that participants in condition AS had an even
bigger sense of this than participants in condition EA. Although
both were perceived as being similarly interested in receiving feed-
back (Q4), participants that interacted with the AS-agent had a
stronger impression that the agent had a desire to be understood.
Next we looked at the agents’ perceived abilities to interpret par-
ticipants’ feedback behaviour. The analysis of item The agent is able
to tell whether or not I have understood what he has said (Q8) yielded
‘strong’, respectively ‘very strong’ evidence that participants in
the attentive speaking condition AS were convinced to a higher
degree that the agent was able to tell whether they understood (or
not) than participants in the two control conditions EA and NA
(which did not differ). Similar, but a little less pronounced, results
were obtained for the item The agent perceived my attitude towards
calendar items (Q9). There was ‘strong’, respectively ‘substantial’,
evidence that participants in the attentive speaking condition AS
rated the agent’s ability to perceive their attitude higher than par-
ticipants in the control conditions EA and NA. Again, the Bayes
factor analysis found no evidence for a difference between the two
control conditions.
Turning to the agents’ abilities to adapt to participants’ needs,
results had a similar relationship as in Q4 and Q5. For the ques-
tionnaire item The agent was attentive to me and adapted to my
needs (Q10) there was ‘strong’, respectively ‘very strong’, evidence
that participants in conditions AS and EA felt more strongly that
the agent they interacted with was attentive and adaptive to their
needs than participants in condition NA. Again, as in Q4, there was
not enough evidence for a difference between the rating of the two
conditions. A plausible explanation may, again, be that even the
EA-agent adapted (by continuing or repeating as requested).
In contrast to this, however, clear differences in participants’
ratings could be observed for the item The agent helped me resolve
difficulties in understanding (Q11). Here, there was ‘decisive’ evid-
ence that participants in the attentive speaking condition AS felt
to a larger degree that the agent helped them resolve difficulties
in understanding as compared to the two control conditions. In
addition, there was substantial evidence that the agent in control
condition EA was rated higher than the agent condition NA.
In conclusion, it can be said that, unsurprisingly, the attentive
speaker agent clearly received more favourable ratings than the
agent in control condition NA, which neither attended to its hu-
man interlocutors’ feedback, nor adapted to their needs at all. The
comparison of the attentive speaker agent to the agent in the con-
trol condition EA, in which the agent explicitly asked its human
interlocutors how to proceed (continue or repeat), is more complex.
Interlocutors of the EA-agent noticed that it wanted to get ‘feed-
back’ from them (Q4) and ‘adapted’ accordingly (Q10) — here the
participants’ subjective perception of the agent did not differ from
the attentive speaking agent. The similar, but more specific, items
Q5 and Q11, however were evaluated differently by participants.
There was ‘substantial’ evidence that participants more strongly
attested the attentive speaker agent a desire to be understood (Q5)
and there was even ‘decisive’ evidence that the participants more
strongly felt that the attentive speaker agent helped them resolve
difficulties in understanding (Q11). In accordance with these find-
ings, participants that interacted with the attentive speaker agent
clearly noticed that this agent had the ability to interpret their feed-
back (Q8 and Q9), which was felt to a lesser degree by participants
that interacted with the EA-agent.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we framed communicative listener feedback as an im-
portant meta-communicative coordination mechanism for reaching
joint understanding in conversational interaction. We argued that
artificial conversational agents should have the capability to use
such a mechanism, too, because it would allow them to approach po-
tential or upcoming problems in understanding (and other listening-
related communicative functions) before they become more serious
and require costly repair actions. Adapting one’s own language
production to the needs of the interlocutor, as indicated through
communicative feedback, is one way of contributing to this effort.
The specific contribution in this paper is a comprehensive eval-
uation study of such an attentive speaker agent, which rests on
models for eliciting, interpreting, and adapting quickly to feedback.
In this interaction study we compared three differently attentive
speaker agents. We first analysed whether human interlocutors
were willing to provide feedback to artificial agents in general
and found that they only did so if the agent was actually attent-
ive to their feedback and responds to it by adapting its behaviour.
Following this we investigated whether participants subjectively
perceived the agents to be different and whether they observed
the attentiveness and adaptivity of the attentive speaker agent and
were aware of the collaborative effort that it made to the interaction.
Here participants noticed that both the attentive speaker agent as
well as one control agent were attentive and adaptive, but only the
attentive speaker agent was perceived as having a desire to make
itself understood as well as being helpful in resolving difficulties in
participants’ understanding.
In conclusion, we can say that in order to receive listener feed-
back from their human interlocutors and to be perceived as an
attentive speaker agent, artificial conversational agents need to
actually be attentive and adaptive to their interlocutors’ feedback
and needs.
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